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Abstract 
 
China’s fuzzy corporate governance rules (whether hard or soft) do not help company managers, 
government officials and others coordinate and cooperate – the raison d’etre for corporate 
governance rules. In a corporate system dominated by personal relationships and rules, clarity 
and specificity – even in principles-based corporate governance – serve Chinese corporations far 
better than passing rules into law or visa versa. We show how existing rules (whether soft, lard, 
mandatory, voluntary, etc.) harm corporate interests. We illustrate how adding clarity makes the 
hard/soft law distinction moot. “Coordinatable” rules which help new Chinese participants in 
corporate governance understand government expectations, follow these understandings, and 
seek recourse through existing mechanisms, will serve Chinese companies better than best 
practice or rules of thumb like having a certain proportion of independent directors, internal 
auditors, etc.  
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Hard Corporate Governance Law in a Soft Law Jurisdiction  
Bryane Michael, University of Hong Kong and  
Say Goo, University of Hong Kong 
 
Introduction 
 
Is it time to move from soft law to hard law in strengthening corporate governance rules? 
Academics have theorised for a long about the role of soft law in improving corporate 
governance – with some announcing that the time has come to adopt hard legal provisions in 
places like China.1 Never mind that the previous reforms to China’s company and other law had 
not demonstrably had revolutionary effects.2 Such reform now simply consists of passing into 
hard law a laundry list of reforms – requiring “independent directors, employee representatives, 
more clearly defined directors’ duties, especially their duties toward stakeholders, mandatory 
information disclosure of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) issues, legitimacy of cross-
listing, effective auditing, and the appointment of independent external auditors.”3 Many scholars 
think that hard law forcing corporate accountability should suffice in lieu of prescriptive 
requirements placed on companies.4 Yet, with the Communist Party has the ultimate engine of 
accountability, to what extent do Chinese firms still need to rely on informal soft law dictates and 
expectations of the Party as opposed to hard law used by private actors and public authorities?5  
 
Our thesis argues that the time has come for “coordinatable” rules which help shape the 
expectations of stakeholders in Chinese companies – clear, hard law rules enforced through 
existing informal mechanisms rather than courts. Following Clarke’s landmark article, new rules 
should comprise ‘law without order’ – concrete orders with consequences spelled out and 
enforced by the regulatory agencies.6 We use Hong Kong’s rules as a contrast when appropriate – 
showing how more specific and concrete rules facilitate the adoption and enforcement of 
corporate governance rules. The first part of our paper “proves” the failure of existing corporate 
governance rules, illustrating the need for clearer, more specific rules for market actors (even 
before considering the law enforcement agencies and courts charged with enforcing them). The 
second section shows how trends in increasingly public/popular participation in Chinese 
corporate life (as owners, suppliers, investors and so forth), have changed the corporate 
governance rules Chinese corporates need. We illustrate this change through transitions in state-
                                                 
1 Liu, Jun-hai, Globalisation of Corporate Governance Depends on Both Soft Law and Hard Law, Corporate 
Governance Codes for the 21st Century, In du Plessis, Jean and Chee-Keong Low, Corporate Governance Codes for 
the 21st Century: International Perspectives and Critical Perspectives, 2017, at pp. 275-294.  
2 Feinerman, James, New Hope for Corporate Governance in China? China Quarterly, 2007, pp. 590-619, available 
online. 
3 Zhao, Jing-chen, Promoting a More Efficient Corporate Governance Model in Emerging Markets Through 
Corporate Law, Washington University Global Studies Law Review 15, 2016, at p. 447, 2016, available online.  
4 Kevin Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational Accountability, Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 35, 2010, available online. 
5 Wang, Jiang-yu, The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s State-owned Enterprises, Cornell 
International Law Journal 35, 2014, available online. 
6 Clarke actually points to the ineffectiveness of China’s law without order approach to corporate governance. 
Regulatory agencies fail to enforce corporate governance rules. As we counter in this paper, clearer hard rules would 
significantly help such enforcement. Clarke, Donald, Law without Order in Chinese Corporate Governance 
Institutions, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 30(1), 2010, available online.  
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owned enterprise governance and in off-shore backdoor listings. Comfort with ambiguous rules 
has helped fuel the reverse merger trends which have emerged as both consequence and result of 
vague corporate governance rules. Ditto with state-owned enterprises, which adapt to remain 
relevant to new stakeholders with new interests. The third section directly discusses China’s 
Code of Corporate Governance – illustrating the fuzziness of rules partly by comparing them to 
more concrete alternatives from Hong Kong. Harder law would not necessarily enable private 
parties or even government agencies trying to enforce them (under conditions where they have 
few if any de jure or de facto property rights).7 Instead, harder law provisions would, at least, 
make clear what businesses and other parties to corporate governance rules should do.8  The final 
section concludes by arguing, in a context like China, that hard law serves as a coordination 
mechanism rather than a means of making and enforcing contracts.  
 
We should start this paper with a few caveats. First, to weave theory and empirics into our paper 
succinctly, we forgo the usual literature review. In line with the new comparative corporate 
governance literature, we engage with theory through our presentation of the relevant data and 
law – often in footnotes when the point addresses something non-critical.9 We save space, more 
directly link theory to facts, and avoid building the grand narratives which have plagued our 
disciple up to the present time.10  Second, we do not provide a complete survey or overview of 
Chinese corporate law or law related to corporate governance issues. Critics might argue that we 
pick-and-choose our topics and instruments to analyse. We do this because of this journal’s space 
constraints – as well as to illustrate the broader point without overwhelming the reader. Third, we 
paint corporate governance law into a dichotomous landscape of soft and hard – with anything 
abstract or vague lying in the realm of soft. We accept that any principles-based rules represent 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law working at the same time – making such labels facile.11 Yet, by keeping 
with the tradition of hard law as specific, concrete, and well-understood by all parties, we 
basically categorise ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ by ends rather than means. Hard law helps corporate 
                                                 
7 As Donaldson and Preston clearly state the “normative base of the [stakeholder] theory—which includes the 
modem theory of property rights—is fundamental.” While “stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate 
interests in procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity,” Chinese persons have far fewer rights 
attached to these interests than in the West. See Donaldson, Thomas and Lee Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the 
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, Academy of Management Review 20(1), 1995.   
8 The contracting view of corporate governance has become so canonical to our conception of corporate governance 
that we no longer even doubt the role of corporate governance rules as an ‘extra set’ of contractual obligations – in 
the public interest so as to increase the effectiveness of contractual provisions made between parties. Yet, before 
such a consensus emerged, many argued for corporate governance rules as facilitating common understanding of 
how companies should act vis-a-vis other stakeholders. See Macey, Jonathan, Corporate Law and Corporate 
Governance: A Contractual Perspective, Journal of Corporation Law 18, 1993.  
9 While authors like Garcia-Castro and colleagues would argue that different countries have their own sets of 
characteristics (and thus defy grand unifying theories), critical authors like Mason and O’Mahony describe the 
problems of traditional corporate governance research, without using all the terms from critical sociology which 
would challenge even the most die-hard jargon fan.  See Roberto, Garcia-Castro, Ruth Aguilera, and Miguel A. 
Arino, Bundles of Firm Corporate Governance Practices: A Fuzzy Set Analysis, Corporate Governance 21(4), 2013. 
See also Mason, Michael, and Joan O'Mahony. Post-Traditional Corporate Governance. Journal of Corporate 
Citizenship Autumn,  2008, available online.  
10 For a discussion, see Wells, Harwell, The Birth of Corporate Governance, Seattle University Law Review 33(1), 
2010, available online.  
11 Laurence Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of Principles-Based Systems in Corporate Law, 
Securities Regulation, and Accounting, Vanderbilt Law Review 60, 2007.  
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stakeholders coordinate, form expectations, and bargain. Soft law (by definition) fails to achieve 
these goals.  
 
An Overview of the Corporate Governance of China’s Companies 
 
The data show significant shortcomings in the Chinese Mainland’s companies’ corporate 
governance.12 Figure 1 shows the gap between standard indices of the quality of China’s 
corporate governance, compared with other jurisdictions for easy reference.13 We show these 
crude data only a lead in to our discussion – and not as samples used to accurate estimate levels 
of corporate governance.14 The quality of the Mainland’s corporate governance remains low – 
despite significant reform over the last 15+ years.15 Both the rules themselves, as well as their 
enforcement, lag behind jurisdictions like Hong Kong and/or Singapore. Figure 2 shows China’s 
companies’ corporate governance scores by each of the dimensions identified in the OECD’s 
Corporate Governance Principles.16 The worst companies score lowly on giving the firms’ 
stakeholders and the supervisory board a say in corporate governance. Even the worst of the 
batch score reasonably well on information disclosure and transparency. Chinese corporate 
governance seems to focus on shareholders – with companies earning the highest scores among 
the set for fairness to shareholders. Yet, none of these measures look at the clarity of these 
rules.17 The measurements themselves might be “hard” in the sense of being specific and clear 
(such as the extent to which audit committees exist and have certain memberships). Yet, the rules 
governing these outcomes usually exhibit large variability in the extent to which they improve 
specific, rather than general, requirements. Following Dr. Love, Corporate governance indicators 
we show reflect the vague, subjective outcomes they seek to measure and promote.18 If true, 
corporate governance rules and their measurement can not existentially comprise “hard” 
                                                 
12 Throughout this paper, we try to refer to China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao) as the Mainland. We follow 
this Hong Kong convention, as most of our comparisons deal with Hong Kong versus the Mainland. Inadvertent slips, 
calling the Mainland “China” or referring to Hong Kong as a country rather than a jurisdiction, reflect our haste 
rather than some deep-seated political views.  
13 See Asian Corporate Governance Association, CG Watch 2014 – Market Rankings, Asian Corporate Governance 
Association Presentation, 2015, available online. 
14 Most statistical work goes toward estimating some “true” level of a variable – like corporate governance (however 
defined). We use these data instead to give overall impressions, without trying to find error bands, entropy or other 
exact measurements of these data. As Schnyder has pointed out, even “objective” measures of corporate governance 
(like measuring the number of independent directors), rather than subjective impressions, miss important interactions. 
Thus, we do not wish the reader to put too much stock in exact values of these variables. See Schnyder, Gerhard, 
Measuring Corporate Governance: Lessons from the ‘Bundles Approach’, University of Cambridge Centre for 
Business Research Working Paper No. 438, 2012, available online.  
15 The summary statistics we show here can not compare with the deep insights that in-depth scholarly analysis of 
Chinese corporate governance provides. See Kang, Yong, Lu Shi, and Elizabeth Brown, Chinese Corporate 
Governance: History and Institutional Framework, Rand Corporation Technical Report 618, 2008, available online. 
16 For the description of the questions used to assess each area, see OECD, G20/OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, 2015, available online. For the data, see Protiviti, Corporate Governance Assessment Summary Report 
on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies for 2012, 2013, available online. For a summary of the OECD’s questions 
(put into convenient tabular Q&A form), see Tong, Lu, Ji-yin Zhong, and Jie Kong, Corporate Governance 
Assessment on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies, 2006, available online. 
17 For one such review of these estimates, see Khanchel, Imen, Corporate Governance: Measurement and 
Determinant analysis, Managerial Auditing Journal 22(8), 2007, available online.  
18 Love, Inessa, Corporate Governance and Performance around the World: What We Know and What We Don't. 
World Bank Research Observer 26(1), 2011.  
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instructions signalling clear expectations about the way the government or management want 
other stakeholders to behave.19  
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Figure 1: The Mainland Could Learn Alot from Hong Kong 
about Improving Its Corporate Governance
The f igure show s corporate governance scores for the Mainland, compared w ith other peers in the Asian region for 2014 (the 
latest year available). The upper scale show s the quality of corporate governance rules (compared w ith a global 100 best 
companies). The low er score show s the quality of corporate governance enforcement. Very signif icant dif ferences in the quality 
of corporate governance mean that corporate governance w ould improve quickly if  China could "import" better regulations and 
enforcement from abroad. See original for variable definitions and methods of compilation. 
Source: Asian Corporate Governance Association (2015). 
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Figure 2: Chinese Corporate Governance Only at 37% of the World's Highest Standards 
The figure show s the corporate governance scores among the largest 100 listed Chinese companies for the areas of 
corporate governance mentioned in the f igure. The red line show s the average across categories. The black bars show
the low est score (for stakeholder participation for example, the low est scoring company only earned 7 out of 100 
points). 
Source: Protiviti (2013).  
 
 
The variation in corporate governance scores among Chinese firms represents a far more 
disconcerting signal about corporate governance rules in the Middle Kingdom than the low 
average scores earned by these companies. Chinese companies score badly on each dimension of 
corporate governance – with an average corporate governance score of around 37% out of the 
100% earned by companies completely implementing the OECD Principles (as shown above in 
Figure 2). Yet, Figure 3 shows the very large variation in corporate governance practices and 
performances among Chinese firms. Corporate governance scores for various companies in a 
range of industries can vary from 30% to 80% of best practice. The trend shows a general 
improvement in corporate governance practices in recent years. Yet, the large variation in these 
scores, both across time and across firms, indicates that China’s corporate governance policies 
are “out of control” (in the statistical sense of the word).20 In other words, because of the large 
                                                 
19 Econometric work has already tried to gauge the truth of this assertion. See Franz, Randal and Dong-hun Lee, 
Global Institutions of Business? Comparing Role-of-Business Expectations in [the, sic] USA, South Korea, Hong 
Kong and Singapore. In Capaldi, Nicolas, Samuel Idowu, and Rene Schmidpeter, Eds., Dimensional Corporate 
Governance: An Inclusive Approach, Springer Publishing, 2017.   
20 Out of control processes refer to processes which exhibit wide variation, making predicting them (and thus 
regulating them) more difficult. See Harp, Nancy, Mark Myring, and Rebecca Shortridge, Do Variations in the 
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variation in corporate governance practices among Chinese firms, policymakers can not adopt 
policies focused on improving such governance until senior managers bring these companies’ 
governance practices “under control.”21 Because of its clarity, only hard law can achieve such 
control – if drafting such law is even epistemologically possible and understandable.22 
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Figure 3: Not Enough Done to Deal with Laggards to Bring 
Corporate Governance "Under Control" 
low est 
score
average 
score
highest score
The f igure show s the w ay that the low est, average and highest corporate governance scores have changed over time 
for the top 100 Chinese listed companies. Despite improvement in average corporate governance scores over time, 
low est scores have remained relatively unchanged. The huge difference in scores betw een f irms suggests that 
policy needs to do better at controlling the variances betw een companies in corporate governance quality.
Source: Protiviti (2013). 
 
 
Variation in corporate governance practices across industries also points to the need for more 
coordinated corporate governance-related rulemaking. As shown in Figure 4, financial services 
firms score a reasonably good 72% out of 100%. Companies in the mining, manufacturing and 
other sectors however, only score between 60% and 65% out of 100%. The government’s post-
2008 extra corporate governance related regulations clearly explain why the financial sector 
scores best.23 The financial sectors experience may suggest that increased government regulation 
and enforcement of corporate governance rules can bring these scores “under control” and raise 
standards across the board. Yet, the specificity of “hard law” financial sector corporate 
                                                                                                                                                              
Strength of Corporate Governance Still Matter? A Comparison of the Pre- and Post-Regulation Environment, 
Journal of Business Ethics 122(3), 2014, available online. See also Fan, Steve and Linda Yu, Variation in Corporate 
Governance and Firm Valuation – an International Study, International Review of Finance (Early View), 2016, 
available online. 
21 Besides being a truism in the Six Sigma literature, even legal scholars have made the case for ensuring such 
control before engaging in reform. For example, see Pacces, Alessio, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Law 
and Economics of Control Powers, Routledge, 2012.   
22 Authors like Zadkovich mistakenly argue that the inflexibility of hard and precise mandatory requirements 
discourages companies and regulators from using them more broadly. Clearly, such a view confuses legal/regulatory 
clarity with enforeability. No a priori reason exists to require mandatory rules to state clear, well-defined practices. 
See Zodkovich, John, Mandatory Requirements, Voluntary Rules And ‘Please Explain’: A Corporate Governance 
Quadmire, Deakin Law Review 12(2), 2007, available online.  
23 In China, as in other jurisdictions, regulators passed a number of corporate governance and other regulations aimed 
at responding to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, as well as strengthening financial institutions in the future. 
Interestingly, Erkens and co-authors find that good corporate governance practices exacerbated the effect of the 
financial crisis on financial firms around the world (including China). As such, policymakers can not rely on simply 
improving corporate governance as a means of promoting financial stability. They will need to draft rules that reduce 
risk-taking behaviour approved of by institutional investors and independent board members. See Erkens, David, 
Ming-Yi Hung, and Pedro Matos, Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial 
institutions worldwide, Journal of Corporate Finance 18, 2012, available online. 
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governance regulations – as opposed to those in other sectors – might well explain these results, 
better than simply the fact they represent hard law.24  
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Figure 4: China's Corporate Governance Scorecard at a Glance
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The f igure show s specif ic measures of Chinese f irms' corporate governance for 2012 (the latest year for w hich 
data is available). Chinese f irms seem to share information w ell. Low  shareholder concentration correlates w ith 
better corporate governance scores. Financial services f irms have the best corporate governance -- no doubt due 
to the increased regulation and scrutiny over the f inancial sector. 
Source: Protiviti (2013). 
 
 
Even a rudimentary glance at various Chinese companies’ corporate practices show reasons for 
these firms’ low corporate governance scores. Figure 4 (already shown above) shows three 
summary statistics about governance practices among Chinese companies – the extent of 
information disclosure, the extent of internal control and the extent of concentration among 
shareholders. While information disclosure ranks highly, lower internal control scores – 
combined with very concentrated shareholdings -- point to the large role that concentrated 
shareholders (rather than rules and regulations) play in governing Chinese business. Companies 
with high shareholder concentration have corporate governance scores of around 60%. 
Companies with low shareholding concentration have corporate governance scores of around 
75%. The effects of corporate governance policies, like shareholder concentration or not, matter 
far less than the effects of such concentration – something that specific corporate governance 
regulations can manage (whether hard or soft).25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Galander and co-authors similarly find that Germany’s soft law financial regulations performed well, not because 
they entered into hard law, but because the rules’ specificity, concreteness, and use to form and force expectations. 
See Galander, Anne, Peter Walgenbach and Katja Rost, Corporate Governance Soft Law Regulations from a Social 
Norm Perspective, Corporate Governance 15(1), 2015, available online. 
25 This pithy sentence reads blithely, yet accurately. In a system designed to give primacy to personal relationships, 
regulations should clearly guide the personalities involved in making corporate governance “understandings” and 
settling disputes. For a description of the personalized nature of corporate governance in China, see Yang, Jing-Jing, 
Jing Chi, and Martin Young, A Review of Corporate Governance in China, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 25, 
2011, available online. 
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A look at disclosure rules and their effects best illustrates the need to focus on regulations 
managing the effects of corporate governance rules.26 Figure 5 shows the improvement in various 
attributes of disclosure and corporate governance in Chinese (Mainland and Hong Kong) 
companies.27 On a five point scale, increases in corporate information barely score 2 out of 5. 
Disclosure comprehensiveness scores a bit less than 1, at a time when the Mainland’s code of 
corporate governance had already been in force for five years. Yet, even with the most 
progressive rules (as illustrated by UK and German companies), companies do not voluntarily 
disclose more (or more relevant) information. Figure 6 shows the extent to which listed firms in 
the UK and Germany (as relatively progressive markets) comply with their corporate governance 
rules.28 Only around 70% of the very largest UK listed firms complied with that country’s 
corporate governance rules. Many fewer of Germany’s largest listed companies complied with 
their version of corporate governance rules. Taken together these data show that simply 
“improving” corporate governance rules will likely have little effect on Mainland information 
disclosure. Rules develop “around” corporate governance rules – such as ‘bonding’ rules -- to 
provide remedies for both hard and soft rules which depend on the personalities affected by those 
rules.29  
                                                 
26 We do not have space to review these disclosure requirements. Readers interested in an in-depth discussion should 
see Fu, Jane, Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Governance in China, 2010.  
27 See CFA Institute, China Corporate Governance Survey, 2007, available online. 
28 See Seidl, David, Paul Sanderson, and John Roberts, Applying ‘Comply-Or-Explain’: Conformance With Codes 
of Corporate Governance in the UK and Germany, University of Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working 
Paper No. 389, 2009, available online. 
29 Bonding refers to expectations minority shareholders have to rights when formal rules give them few, vis-a-vis 
block or majority shareholders. See Cai, Hua, Bonding, Law Enforcement and Corporate Governance in China, 
Stanford Journal of the Law of Business and Finance 13, 2008. As if to belabour the point about the personalisation 
of corporate governance law, see Shi, Chen-xia, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance in China, 
Routledge, 2012.  
 8
 0 1 2 3
Shareholder responsive
Voting fairness
Share rights 
Outside questions listen
Salary aligned
Disclose comp.
Indep. Dir. Effectiveness
Audit committee effect.
Indep. Dir. skills
Duality
Manage skill
Supervisory board effect
Board skills
Information timeliness
Info. accuracy
Info. complete
Figure 5: Little Improvement in Chinese Disclosure and Other Corporate 
Governance Measures Five Years After Mainland Code in Took Effect
improvement 
(0=none and 
5=greatly)
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
FTSE 1-30 
Dax 30
FTSE 31-80   
Mdax
FTSE 81-130  
Sdax
FTSE 1-30 
Dax 30
FTSE 31-80   
Mdax
FTSE 81-130  
Sdax
pe
rc
en
t
UK
Germany
percent of fully compliant firms percent of provisions complied
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A few examples of the personalisation of corporate governance in China make plain that hard 
rules serve to promote concrete expectations and aim in coordination more than as a mechanism 
for transferring rights, obligations and the basis for private/enforcement (as in the private agency 
view of corporate governance).30 First, Chow notes more disclosure and better governance could 
actually cost managers their lives and freedom.31 The Communist Party uses politically 
motivated purges of companies and government bodies using the information obtainable from 
more open corporate reporting (as support for anticorruption investigations and prosecutions). I
such an environment, no company has the incentive to freely disclose information. The 
government uses such opacity to conceal the real reasons for politically motivated prosecutions. 
Second, as Narine notes, disclosures rely on the company’s stakeholders to act on these 
disclosures.
n 
 
r 
 law should take such personality 
to account.  
ncreasing Participation as the Driver of Corporate Governance Regulatory Change  
 
er 
                                                
32 The recent Sanlu case (of tainted milk) best illustrates how discretionary 
government involvement in corporate affairs on the Mainland make disclosure rules impossible
to adopt and enforce. 33 In that case, the government actively discouraged corporate executives 
from making disclosures that could have saved lives and investors money.34 With stakeholders 
unable or unwilling to act on information (due to government policy), the value within the 
country of such information remains questionable. Even wide-spread fraud among Mainland 
firms listed abroad has not led to any kind of domestic response on the Mainland – either fo
tighter rules as promulgated by the government or criticism from investors and other 
stakeholders.35 Indeed, disclosure remains at such a basic level as to hinder even researchers 
looking the extent of disclosure among Chinese firms.36 In these contexts, personality mattered 
more than hard or soft law – reform of corporate governance
in
 
I
 
The management of China’s state-owned enterprises best illustrates the problems of writing and 
trying to use corporate governance hard and soft law. Xu and Xu describe the travails of China’s
Open State Owned Enterprise (SOE) Information Bill.37 They argue that the public has an even 
larger right to information about SOEs, as the government and these SOEs work in the interests 
of the people.38 Their argument about access to information as a human right, as a way to low
 
30 That is not to say that nothing in Chinese corporation relations supports the Western style agency theory as a 
rationale for regulation. See Canan Mutlu, Marc Van Essen, Mike Peng, Sabrina Saleh, Agency Theory and 
Corporate Governance in China: A Meta-Analysis, Bepress Working Paper, 2016, avialable online. 
31 Chow, Daniel, How China's Crackdown on Corruption Has Led to Less Transparency in the Enforcement of 
China's Anti-Bribery Laws, U.C. Davis Law Review 49(2), 2015, available online.  
32 Narine talks about the effects of disclosure on human rights. Yet, her discussion is entirely general. See Narine, 
Marcia, Disclosing Disclosure's Defects: Addressing Corporate Irresponsibility for Human Rights Impacts, 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 47(1), 2015.  
33 See Fu, Jenny and Geoffrey Nicoll, The Milk Scandal and Corporate Governance in China, Canberra Law Review 
10(3), 2011.  
34 Id at p. 123.  
35 See McCarty, Janelle, Mergers & Accusations: Chinese Auditing and Corporate Disclosure Standards Indirectly 
on Trial in the United States, Minnesota Journal of International Law 21(2), 2012.  
36 See Tucker, Jennifer and Xin-Min Zhang, Corporate disclosure and research opportunities in China, Journal of 
Accounting Studies, 2016, available online. 
37 We could not find any mention of the adoption of the proposed Act. We thus must rely on Xu and Xu’s description. 
See Xu, Xue-Lei Xu and Xin Xu, Information Disclosure of State-Owned Enterprises in China, Tsinghua China Law 
Review 4(1), 2011, available online. 
38 Id at p. 4.  
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social costs, and to reduce conflicts of interest in government might seem strange to western 
ears.39 Yet, when considered in the light of our thesis, their call for greater transparency echoes 
the need for shared understandings for coordination. The authors note only information sharing
which harms the corporation and its interests should remain undisclosed – as “the bottom l
should be defined: once information is disclosed to the public, the corporation will suffer 
substantial losses. For example, the proprietary knowledge of a corporation should not be 
disclosed because leaks in proprietary knowledge will provide the corporation’s competitors w
an obvious advantage.”
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rporate governance law needs to accommodate 
eir participation in China’s corporate life.43  
 in 
st 
ugh the 
E 
f companies 
40 Such a legal doctrine seems at odds with past SOE management in 
China.41 Nevertheless, as a contributor to the OECD guidelines on the corporate governance of 
SOEs, the government “Recognis[es] that state-owned enterprises face some distinct governa
challenges arising from the fact that their ownership is exercised by government officials on 
behalf of the general public.”42 As the public becomes a larger and more important stakeholder
China’s corporations (state owned and not), co
th
 
The data further show that the Mainland’s SOEs need special rules and enforcement practices
order just to catch up with private sector firms. Figure 7 shows the percent of Chinese SOEs 
providing information about various aspects of their corporate existence and operations.44 Mo
state-owned enterprises disclose information about their organisational structure (tho
extent to which they report on the exact structure...including relations with offshore 
entities...remains unknown).45 Reports about capital investment remain popular – as a way SO
executives can brag to the central government.46 If heavy industry continues to release news 
about its achievements, service, agricultural and even information technology companies have far 
less political and economic clout, as reflected in their lacklustre reporting. Only 9% o
provide information about their human resources. Such a situation doesn’t – as most 
commentators suggest – show the backwardness or lack modernity in China’s corporate 
                                                 
39 Id. III.D.  
40 Id at p. 32.  
41 Zhang, Dong and Owen Freestone, China's Unfinished State-Owned Enterprise Reforms, Australian Treasury 
Economic Roundup 2, 2013, available online.  
42 OECD, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2015, at p. 9 (Recommend
of the Council on Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises), available 
ation 
online. 
43 Wang best illustrates this shifting need – from Party members to the wider public – for corporate governance ru
which facilitate and coordinate action. Tenev and co-authors provide a less philosophical, and more tangible, 
description of such increasing participation. See Wang, Zhao-Feng, C
les 
orporate Governance Under State Control: The 
Chinese Experience, Theoretical Inquiries in Law 13.2, 2012, available online. See also Tenev, Stoyan, Chun-lin
Zhang, and Loup Brefort, Corporate Governance and Enterp
 
rise Reform in China: Building the Institutions of 
Modern Markets. World Bank Monograph, 2002, available online.  
44 See See Xu, Xue-Lei Xu and Xin Xu, Information Disclosure of State-Owned Enterprises in China, Tsinghua 
China Law Review 4(1), 2011, at p. 23, available online 
45 China’s Going Out Policy further complicates matters – as these firms may have legitimate commercial interests 
y of 
offshore which represent more than simply incorporating shell companies in offshore fiscal paradises. See Chen, 
Duan-Jie, China’s State-Owned Enterprises: How Much Do We Know? From CNOOC to its Siblings? Universit
Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 6(19), 2013, available online.    
46 The politics of investment often over-ride the economics of profit maximisation, making corporate governan
less necessary for these SOEs without a clear policy from the centre. See Leutert, Wendy, Challenges Ahead in
China’s Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, Asia Poli
ce far 
 
cy 21, 2016, available online. 
 11
governance.47 The choice between using hard versus soft law isn’t the same as choosing to drive 
in over-drive versus cruise.48 Lack of principles and purposes of transparency and disclosure fo
these SOEs make working with these companies unpredictable for all parties under conditio
when higher ranking Party officials do not always define the governance regime they want 
dynamically and win every argument.
r 
ns 
e 
es, nor set the basis for conflict and coordination inherent in any 
orporate governance rules.50   
 
                                                
49 “Integrated fragmentation” may represent the way th
Party and business interact – but such an arrangement does not help with the governance of 
China’s SOEs, private compani
c
 
47 For such a modernist view, see Howson, Nicholas and Vikramaditya Khanna, The Development of Modern 
Corporate Governance in China and India, In M. Sornarajah and J. Wang, China, India and the International 
Economic Order, Cambridge University Press, 2010.  
48 The view of good corporate governance, as a destination which governments can use laws to arrive at more or less 
quickly, permeates the literature. See Miles, Lilian & Zhong Zhang, Improving Corporate Governance in State-
Owned Corporations in China: Which Way Forward?, Journal of Corporate Law Studies 6(1), 2006. See also Wang, 
Jiang-Yu, Corporate Governance in China: The Law and Its Political Logic, In Roman Tomasic Ed., Routledge 
Handbook of Corporate Law, Routledge, 2016) at Chapter 11.  
49 Baosteel represents a fascinating case study into the informal norms and politics that defines China’s corporate 
governance of state-owned enterprises. To summarise the author’s point, “The People’s Standing Committee, the 
highest Chinese Communist Party organization of China’s state owned enterprises [serves a] complementary role for 
an imperfect board of directors in corporations which [follow the] modern enterprise system, and provides 
supervision and assistance [ ] to corporate top management as an internal control mechanism” (we edited as shown to 
clarify the English). See Cho, Dong-Sung and Fei Huang, A Study on Corporate Governance of China's State-Owned 
Enterprises -- Focus on the Role of the Baosteel CCP’s Organization. Journal of International Business Research 
10(1), 2011, available online. 
50 Brodsgaard, Kjeld, Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control? China Quarterly 
211(1), 2012.  
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Figure 7: Mainland Companies Have a Long Way to Go to 
Implement the Open SOE Information Act?
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The figure show s the percent of companies providing information about their group, human resources, f inances, 
profits/reveues, capital investment and organisational structure -- by economic sector. We show  the data as stacked 
bars to make the f igure easier to read. For example, 11% of companies in the heavy industry sector provide information 
about their capital investment and 15% of them provide information about their organisaton structure Thus, adding these
bars has no meaning. 
Source: Xu and Xu (2012) at p. 23. 
 
Nothing shows the misunderstandings arising from China’s corporate governance soft law than 
the frauds discovered in Chinese corporations listed abroad through a manoeuvre knows as a 
“backdoor listing”51 A backdoor listing occurs when a company unable or unwilling to engage in 
an initial public offering cooperates with already listed company to buy the unlisted company.  
Figure 8 shows the number of reverse mergers (or backdoor listings) by Mainland companies in 
the US and UK.52 Despite the global financial crisis, these de facto IPOs have increased over 
time. Regulation clearly plays a role – as Chinese companies overwhelmingly chose the US, 
rather than the UK, to list.53 Yet, we know that 75% of finance professionals polled in a recent 
survey answered ‘no’ to the question about whether the current backdoor listing rules are 
effective.54 The flurry of delistings of backdoor listed Chinese companies in the US, due to fraud 
or other problems – seems to suggest that these listings correspond with poor corporate 
                        
governance in the firms concerned. Figure 9 shows the number of these backdoor listings 
eventually delisted by year.55 On average, corporate malfeasance and the consequent delisting 
                         
51 Readers unfamiliar with backdoor listings (reverse mergers) should see Erik Vermeulen, Rules on Backdoor 
Listings: A Global Survey, 2014, available online. See also Jan Jindra, Torben Voetmann, and Ralph A. Walkling, 
Reverse Mergers: The Chinese Experience, Fischer College of Business Working Paper 2012-03-018, 2012, 
available online. 
52 See Cornerstone Research: Investigations and Litigation Related to Chinese Reverse Merger Companies: Financial, 
Economic, and Accounting Questions, 2011, available online. 
53 We do not know the trends for Hong Kong because the SFC has been either unable or unwilling to collect and 
publish these statistics. 
54 SFC, SFC Regulatory Forum 2016, Polling Results, 2016, available online.   
55 See Charles Lee, Kevin Li, and Ran Zhang, Shell Games: The Long Term Performance of Chinese Reverse 
Merger Firms, 2014, available online.  
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took about 6 years. Figure 10 shows the Bloomberg Chinese reverse merger index and the 
number of class action lawsuits against these Mainland corporations. As shown, the reverse 
merger index fell as fraud cases piled up – showing how lax corporate governance can harm 
company valuations. Yet, one (Western) person’s fraud represents another (Chinese) person’s 
misunderstanding.56 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
nu
m
be
r 
ba
ck
do
or
 li
st
in
gs
US
UK
The figure show s the number of backdoor listings per year by Chinese companies in the UK and US. If the US and UK 
started out on similar levels, the US pulled into the lead quickly. As noted in the main text, roughly 75% of Hong Kong 
interview ees answ ered in the negative to the question "the current rules and regulations to prevent backdoor listings 
are effective?" We could f ind no annual data for Hong Kong. 
Source: Cornerstone Research for US data (2011) and Vermeulen at Figure 9, 2014.  
Figure 8: Backdoor Listings Continued Despite On-Going 
Promises to Reform 
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Figure 9: Delisted Chinese Companies Took On Average 6 Years to Blow Up 
The figure show s the number of Chinese f irms, by year, engaged in reverse mergers only to f ind themselves delisted 
due to fraud or other reasons. We show  the year both of the reverse merger and the year of delisting. We took the av
across all companies in Lee et al.'s list to f ind the 6 year average time from merger to delisting.  
Source: Lee et al. 2014. 
erage 
 
                                                 
56 Such a “misunderstanding” would not represent a misunderstanding in China, where expectations allow for,
expect, such business practices... understood by all parties. For a misunderstand of this misunderstanding, see Shan, 
Yuan and David Round, China's Corporate Governance: Emerging Issues and Problems, Modern Asian Studies 46(5),
2012.  
 and 
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Many observers blame reverse mergers themselves for the reduction of the quality of listed 
ompanies. Yet, as Chen and colleagues note, a “China effect” explains these listings’ problems 
e 
 
l 
matically constrain the 
economic and directorial power of the PRC's most powerful, formally non-governmental, 
c
much better than any “reverse merger effect.”57 Mainland companies’ managers and even 
Communist Party overseers clearly failed to detect and rectify significant weaknesses in thes
companies’ accounting and corporate governance standards – leading to valuations which only
came to half those of their IPO counterparts.58 Such events belie these overseers’ 
“complementary role for an imperfect board of directors in corporations which [follow the] 
modern enterprise system, and provides supervision and assistance [ ] to corporate top 
management as an internal control mechanism.”59 The current regime of "fragmented 
authoritarianism" shows that China’s hard corporate governance isn’t hard enough, and soft 
corporate governance is not soft enough.60 “’Fragmented authoritarianism’ [is] where a centra
government agency has instituted pre-enforcement designs that syste
                                                 
57 See Chen, Kun-Chih, Cheng Qiang, Ying-Chou Lin, Yu-Chen Lin and Xiao Xing, Financial Reporting Quality of 
ne
Chinese Reverse Merger Firms: The Reverse Merger Effect or the China Effect?", Singapore Management 
University’s School of Accountancy Working Paper 12-2013, 2013, available onli .  
S, 
these harms. Chai et al. dispute that reverse 
perform worse than IPOs or Chinese companies based in the US. Chai and Lau see nothing sinister 
ng 
, 
58 Initial public offerings (IPOs) result in the listing of companies following higher standards due the significant 
screening done before listing. In contrast, screening of companies listing via reverse mergers remains lax in the U
Hong Kong and other jurisdictions. Yet, not everyone agrees about 
merger firms 
about the delisting we have shown – as companies with poor corporate governance got kicked out, and those stayi
adopted even higher corporate governance standards. See also Chai, Mary and Virginia Lau, Bonding versus 
Avoiding Theory: Evidence from Accrual and Real Earnings Management of Chinese Reverse Merger Companies
AFAANZ 2016 Conference, available online. For the market value statistics we cite, see PCAOB, Activity Summ
and Audit Implications for Reverse Mergers Involving Companies from the China Region: 2 January 1,
ary 
 2007 through 
March 31, 2010, PCAOB Research Note 2011-P1, available online. See also Chai, Mary Virginia Lau, Kitty X
The End Justifies the Means? Signalling Effect of How and Where to List, Paper#: K227, Seventh Asia Pacific 
Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting Conference, Kobe 26-28 July, 2013, available 
ie, 
online. 
59 We took Cho and Huang’s quote from previously, and introduced it in the main text. We repeat the quote to 
underline the importance this world-view has on Chinese corporate governance.  
n 60 Nicholas Howson, 'Quack Corporate Governance' as Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities Regulatio
Cannibalization of China's Corporate Law and a State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic 
Power, Seattle University Law Review 37, 2014, available online.  
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political economic actors.”61 Clearly, China’s corporate governance exhibits integrated 
fragmentation and fragmented authoritarianism – a condition whereby China’s elites try to help 
manage China’s corporations, while these elites try to keep corporate governance laws fuzzy 
enough to stop the central authorities from disrupting their understandings with company 
managers. Conventional commentators which miss this dialectic miss the whole dynamic 
rendering the distinction between China’s hard and soft corporate governance law moot.62 Rules 
should be “coordinatable.”  
 
Updating China’s Code of Corporate Governance and Other Regulations 
 
Many studies we have already reviewed have argued that Chinese corporate governance would 
improve only if China’s rules improved. Foreign listings of Chinese companies supposedly 
import foreign corporate governance rules.63 Many of these companies incorporate offshore – 
making offshore incorporations a key part of this import process.64 We previously dispelled the 
 import “better” corporate governance rules. Yet, no one can notion that Chinese companies can
deny that some corporate governance rules help improve companies’ market valuations more 
than others. Figure 11, for example, shows the way that Chinese market valuations have changed 
in response to the valuation of their American Depository Receipts (ADRs).65 Offering access to 
Chinese companies’ shares in the US has significantly more effects on Mainland companies’ 
market values than offering such access in Hong Kong or Taiwan.  
                                                 
61 Id at p. 1.  
62 Literally hundreds of modernist writers treat Chinese corporate governance like a game or skill which Chinese
have learnt poorly compared to other jurisdictions. See On Kit Tam, On Kit and Celina Ping Yu, China’s Corporate 
Go
 
vernance Development, In Christine A. Mallin, Christine, Handbook on International Corporate Governance, 
2011. See also Guo, Liang, Clive Smallman, and Jack Radford. A critique of corporate governance in China, 
International Journal of Law and Management 55(4), 2013, available online. We could go on all day.  
63 To take an example, Sun and Tobin argue that Bank of China’s cross-listing in Hong Kong helped promote 
convergence of its corporate governance. Yet, they provide no evidence – listing data on financial performance 
instead. See Sun, Lai-Xiang and Damian Tobin, Corporate Governance Reform and International Listing: Case of
Bank of
 the 
 China (Hong Kong), Centre for Financial and Management Studies Discussion Paper, 2003, available 
online.  
64 The British Virgin Islands in the Bank of China case cited in the main body of this paper. See Id at Figure 1.  
65 Pan, Lee-Hsien, Chien-Ting Lin , and K.C. Chen, ADR Characteristics and Corporate Governance in the Greater 
China Region, Review of Development Finance 2, 2012, available online.  
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Figure 11: Why Might US Corporate Governance Rules Push Up Chinese Market
Valuations More than Others? 
The figure show s the w ay that Chinese companies' ADR prices changed in response to the offering of these 
depository receipts overseas (in the jurisdictions show n) -- and after controlling for confounding variables. For 
example, market prices-to-book values increased most w hen Chinese companies offered ADRs on the US NASDAQ 
and a bit less w hen offered on the AMEX. Moving the offer to Hong Kong w ould cause market valuations to fall -- 
w ith the most fall corresponding to the offer of ADRs in Taiw an. Yet, the variance explained by the authors' models 
only comes to a relatively low ly 0.22.                                                                                Source: Pan et al. (2012). 
 
 
How have Mainland corporate governance rules adapted to changing markets and growing access 
to foreign exchanges? China’s corporate governance regulations – as well as corporate 
governance itself – have changed (improved from a Western mindset) by leaps and bounds since 
the 2002 publication of its Code of Corporate Governance.66 Yet, by senior officials’ own 
admission, China’s corporate governance regulations should improve far more in a wide-array of 
ways. Figure 12 shows the most important areas recently identified by senior Chinese officials 
themselves.67 Disseminating a revised code of corporate governance probably represents the 
easiest task to accomplish. Yet, even scratching at the surface of the most important 
recommendations reveals a completely different notion of what Chinese commentators actually 
mean. “Removing soft budget constraints in former state owned enterprises,” for example, does 
not mean their complete elimination (as senior Party members can easy ban such lending). Such 
reform requires that “to harden budget constraints, political institutions need to be reconfigured to 
allow the central government more effectively to hold local authorities accountable for resources 
deployed in achieving their job-performance targets.”68 Something very different – basically 
asserting that oversight should stop stupid (unprofitable) lending. The rules governing such 
lending should coordinatable – allowing soft lending in a way which allows managers to achieve 
goals, rather than personal interests.69  
                                                 
66 See China Securities Regulatory Commission, Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, 
Zhengjianfa No.1 of 2002, 2002, available online.  
67 For example, see Hu, Ru-Yin, Efforts to Improve Corporate Governance in China, OECD Conference on the 
Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprises, 2015, available online. See also Protiviti (2013) at Tables 2 and 
3. 
68 Indeed, the current system could hardly survive with such soft-lending. O
shows why Mainland officials would never even conceive of “removing” as
ng provides the quote, while Skoog 
 ‘ending’ soft lending – but rather as 
nding unproductive soft lending arising from coordination problems. See Ong, Lynette, Fiscal federalism and soft 
g, 
 
ching 
2014, available online
e
budget constraints: The case of China, International Political Science Review 33(4), 2011, at p. 455. See also Skoo
Gun-Eriksson, The Soft Budget Constraint — The Emergence, Persistence and Logic of an Institution, Springer, 
2000.  
69 Wu shows this most clearly; he hardly needs to draw on decades of failure to reform soft budget constraints as
evidence of the need to coordinate governance reform in a way which benefits all parties. See Wu, Alfred, Sear
for Fiscal Responsibility: A Critical Review of the Budget Reform in China, China: An International Journal 12 (1), 
. 
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The figure shows the activities identified by Chinese officials to improve the Mainland's corporate governance. Hong 
Kong has already developed significant experience in tackling most of these issues. 
* represents an easy activity (1-3)  
black bars represent an activity which Hong Kong has yet to master itself.  
 
Basic drafting problems – namely the scattering of corporate governance provisions across 
gislative or administrative instruments -- hinders Chinle ese directors and corporate stakeholders 
from understanding corporate governance obligations and best practices. The legislative acts 
containing corporate governance provisions include the 2006 Company Law (mainly about 
shareholder protection and board structure), the 2006 Securities Law (mainly governing investor 
 18
protection and disclosure), the 2006 Criminal Law Amendment Act (mainly fraud, insider trading 
and non-compliance with other regulations), the 2009 Law on the State-Owned Assets of 
Enterprises (regulating mainly how state owned enterprises should behave), and the 2000 
Accounting Law (ensuring accurate financial reporting and oversight).70 Other peripheral rules 
include the 2007 Regulations on Listed Companies’ Information Disclosure, the 2006 Guidance 
on Listed Companies’ Articles of Association, the 2006 Rules on Listed Companies’ 
Shareholders’ Meetings, the 2001 Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of the System of 
Independent Directors in Listed Companies, the 2004 Provisions on Strengthening the Protection 
of the Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders, the 2006 Regulations on the Takeover of 
Listed Companies, the 2008 Regulations on Major Asset Reorganisation of Listed Companies, 
the 2005 Regulations on Equity Incentives of Listed Companies, the 2006 Regulations on the 
Registration and Settlement of Securities and the 2008 Basic Standard for Enterprise Internal 
Control.71 We could not find the rules governing Articles of Association of Companies Seeking a 
Listing outside the PRC Prerequisite Clauses at all. We do not discuss specific corporate 
overnance rules focused on securities/financial firms.72 
at least 
 
h 
and 
cale of 
                                                
g
 
What is the extent of such scattering? As shown in Figure 13, companies need to consult 
7 laws in order to assess the extent to which they comply with the OECD Corporate Governance
Principles. As shown, the Company Law contains most of the relevant provisions. Yet, the 
official code of corporate governance applies to only about 15% of the relevant provisions. Suc
dispersion complicates managers’ ability to draft relevant corporate governance decisions 
internal auditors’ ability to check them. Obviously problems must exist – given the poor 
governance performance of the Mainland’s companies. As noted previously, on a 5 point s
improvement, none of the areas of corporate governance tracked improved by 3 points or more.73  
  
 
70 We take these laws from Yang and co-authors.  See Yang, Hua, Zehua Ouyang, Li-Xin Zhao, Jian-Chun Cai, 
Qian-Song An, Bo-Jin Yan, Yan Liu, Ming Huang, Wei-Dong Zhang, Chun-Sheng Pan, Huan Zhu, Li Gao, Xing-
Hui Jiang, Hong-Xia Sun, Xue-Yue Jiang, Zhao-Hui Chen, Jian-Shan Huang, Xu Yong, Shun-Ying Ren, Jiang-Xuan 
She, Wei Ren, and Hong-Da Zhou, Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in China: Self-Assessment by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2011, available online.  
71 We do not link to all of these – as they are mostly peripheral to our discussion. For readers interested in these rules, 
, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance in and the institutional system generating them, see Shi, Chen-Xia
China, 2012.  
72 See CSRC, Provisional Code of Corporate Governance for Securities Companies, 2004, available online. 
73 CFA Institute, China Corporate Governance Survey, 2007, available online. 
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Figure 13: Mainland Corporate Governance Law Spread Across Various Instruments
The figure show s the number of times a legislative or regulatory act serves to comply w ith the 121 OECD corporate 
governance principles (as assessed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission). The other category includes 
law s ranging from the criminal code to the bankruptcy law  (depending on the applicability of each law  for the provision 
mentioned). 
Source: Yang et al. (2011). 
 
 
How can Chinese stakeholders coordinate using corporate governance rules which define 
principles too vague to understand, much less adopt and rely upon? Figure 14 shows the 
principles enshrined in the Chinese Code of Corporate Governance.74 Defining some terms like 
“damage”, “necessary means” or interference” remain uncontroversial – and indeed similar in 
Hong Kong’s code. Yet, three principles in particular look very difficult to interpret in a 
 
Mainland context. First, particularly Section 2 of Chapter 2’s the Independence of Listed 
Company stipulates that, “controlling shareholders shall respect the financial independence of the 
company and shall not interfere.”75 The obvious question arises about the extent to which 
government officials and state-owned entities serving as controlling shareholders can (or should) 
refrain from directing and interfering in these companies. We have already pointed to the social 
mandate given to China’s companies – both state-owned and private. Second, Chapter 7(3) 
covers the declaration of beneficial ownership in Mainland companies. The section requires the
declaration to shareholders of persons who a) own a comparatively large percentage of shares of 
the company, b) actually control the company when acting in concert, c) change their 
shareholding (and/or factors causing such changes), d) pledge the company’s shares, and/or e) 
transfer control of the company.76 
 
                                                 
74 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, Zheng 
Jian Fa No.1 of 2002, 2002, available online. 
75 Several articles in the section contain this formulaic phrase.  
ommunity of the firms’ stakeholders.  
76 The declaration to shareholder probably constitutes a minimum standard. When viewed in combination with 
Chapter 6 and 7.1, one could claim that such information sharing can extend beyond shareholders to the wider 
c
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Tightening principles based on their coordinatability would allow for corporate governance codes 
which reduce, rather than increase, uncertain abstraction in China’s law. Chapter 6 of the Code 
looks suspiciously like the socialist regulation which the government has supposedly tried to roll-
back for decades. Article 86 admonishes companies to consider the “welfare, environmental 
protection and public interests of the community in which it resides, and ... pay attention to the 
company’s social responsibilities.”77 Proposals abound for making this text more concrete.78 
Most revolve around concrete and specific rules, placed into the classical branches of law as a 
Western scholar might see these branches (labour, criminal, civil, etc.).79 Hard or soft reforms in 
areas targeted by Article 86 have failed, not because they comprised hard or soft law, but because 
these provisions did not represent a concrete consensus agreement by those Chinese companies 
affected.80  Just as no distinction truly exists in corporate social responsibility between implicit 
and explicit rules, hard and soft monikers for corporate governance regulation also melt when 
seen from the perspective of coordinatability.81 The literature takes a costly detour when splitting 
hairs and trying and describe such law by dividing provisions in endorsing, facilitating, 
                                                 
77 See China Securities Regulatory Commission, Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, 
Zheng Jian Fa No.1 of 2002, 2002, available online. 
Code of Corporate Governance 
for Listed Companies 
78 For one example, see Buhmann, Karin, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Current Issues and Their 
Relevance for Implementation of Law, Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 22(1), 2005, available online. 
79 See Cooney, Sean, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in the People's 
Republic of China, Fordham International Law Journal 30, 2006, available online.  
80 Lin, Li-Wen, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or Structural Change, Berkeley Journal 
of International Law 28, 2010, available online. 
81 Dirk Matten, Dirk and Jeremy Moon, “Implicit” and “Explicit” CSR: A Conceptual Framework for a Comparative 
eUnderstanding of Corporate Social Responsibility, Academy of Management Review 33(2), 2008, available onlin .  
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partnering, mandating, and so forth.F82F Similar attempts to divide such law as ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ also miss the point.F83F Even a cursory look at Figure 14 shows how the concept of 
coodinatability captures what these other labels miss. Maybe scholars have not seen the “fall of 
regulation” or the “rise of governance” in analysing Chinese corporate governance.F84F Maybe 
coodinatable rules represent those corporate governance rules that represent real regulation in 
China.  
 
4BConclusions 
 
Should Chinese authorities adopt more hard law when governing corporate interests and 
behaviour? A long literature exists on the topic – having not come to any consensus and often 
talking in circles. In this article, we hope to break out of the impasse by describing coodinatable 
corporate governance rules – concrete, specific, agreeable rules that corporate governance 
stakeholders (individuals with real interests in these corporations) can agree to. Principles-based 
or not. Mandatory or not. In a personality-driven system, clarity and tangibility represent the 
most important attributes of corporate governance rules that individuals follow.  Such a focus on 
coodinatability removes the need to focus on corporate governance benchmarks (like the percent 
of independent board members or the existence of an audit board). If China’s corporate 
governance rules have not performed as analysts would have hoped (both in the Middle Kingdom 
and abroad), they should consider looking for existence, nature, and acceptability of 
coordinatable rules that help, rather than hinder.  
                                                 
82 Ho, Virginia, Beyond Regulation: A Comparative Look at State-Centric Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
Law in China, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 46, 2013.  
83 Jiang, Fu-xiu and Kenneth Kim, Corporate governance in China: A Modern Perspective, Journal of Corporate 
Finance 32, 2015, available HUonlineUH.  
84 Lobel, Orly, The Renew Deal: The Fall Of Regulation And The Rise Of Governance In Contemporary Legal 
Thought, University of San Diego School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-27, 2005, available HUonlineUH. 
